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I. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Probable Cause to Arrest
In Jefferson v. United States,1 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
recognized the controlling force of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Illinois v. Gates.2 In Gates, the Supreme Court abandoned the Agui-
lar-Spinelli "two-pronged test"3 and held that the totality of the
circumstances analysis' should be employed to determine the existence of
1. 476 A.2d 685 (D.C. 1984).
2. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
3. Id. at 238. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969) comprise the two-pronged test for determining whether an informant's tip
establishes probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Under Aguilar's "basis of
knowledge test," the magistrate issuing the warrant "must be informed of some of the underly-
ing circumstances from which the informant concluded that [a crime occurred], and some of
the underlying circumstances from which the officer (who seeks the warrant] concluded that
the informant . . .was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
Under Spinelli, the magistrate must examine the informant's basis of knowledge and evaluate
the informant's veracity. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16. Prior to Gates, both the basis of knowl-
edge and the veracity prongs of the test had to be satisfied in order for the magistrate to
lawfully issue the warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 228-30. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court refused to follow Gates and adhered to the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Commonwealth v.
Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
4. The totality of the circumstances analysis set out in Gates includes an examination of
the informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, as well as other indicia of reliability. The
corroboration of innocent details provided by the informant can play a part in the totality of
the circumstances analysis. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-35, 244-45.
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probable cause to issue a warrant. 5
In Jefferson, the defendant moved before trial to suppress evidence by ar-
guing that the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test was not met because the
facts supported neither the veracity of the informant nor the basis of the
informant's knowledge.6 The trial court reached a finding of probable cause
based on the information provided by the informant and denied the motion
to suppress.7 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, applying the Gates
totality of the circumstances approach, found sufficient facts to establish
probable cause.8 The court noted that the informant had personal knowl-
edge that the defendant sold narcotics, and that the informant had given
information on nine prior occasions that led to arrest and discovery of nar-
cotics.9 Most significantly, the court considered the corroboration of inno-
cent details in this probable cause analysis,' ° and saw that the description
given by the informant matched that of the suspect observed by police
officers.' 1
B. Drunk Driving Arrests
The trial court's finding of a valid misdemeanor arrest for drunk driving
was reversed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Schram v.
District of Columbia.12 In a per curiam opinion, the court found that the
requirements for a warrantless misdemeanor arrest' 3 were not met and that
breathalyzer test results must therefore be suppressed. 4 For a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest to be valid, the arresting officer must have probable
cause to believe that the offense was committed in his or her presence.' In
Schram, the arresting officer arrived on the scene of an automobile accident
after the driver, defendant Schram, was no longer in her vehicle. 6  A
5. Id. at 238.
6. Jefferson, 476 A.2d at 686.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 687.
9. Id.
10. In accepting the corroboration of innocent details in the probable cause analysis, the
court overruled Nance v. United States, 377 A.2d 384 (D.C. 1977). Jefferson, 476 A.2d at 686.
Nance had held that the corroboration of innocent details was not sufficient in itself to estab-
lish the veracity of the informant. 377 A.2d at 389-90.
11. 476 A.2d at 687.
12. 485 A.2d 623 (D.C. 1984). For a detailed discussion of this case and of the misde-
meanor arrest rule, see Note, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrest for Drunk Driving Found Inva-
lid in Schram v. District of Columbia, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1241 (1985).
13. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581(a)(1)(B) (1981).
14. 485 A.2d at 624.
15. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581(a)(1)(B) (1981).
16. 485 A.2d at 624.
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breathalyzer test of Schram at the scene indicated that she was legally intoxi-
cated.' 7 The court of appeals held that the offense, driving while intoxi-
cated, could not have been committed in the presence of the police officer
because when the officer arrived on the scene, Schram was not in her car.'
C. Miranda Rights
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Miley v. United States,'9
affirmed the trial court's decision to admit defendant's statements that were
made during custodial interrogation but before Miranda warnings were
given.2° The trial court had held that no interrogation took place in this
case and denied defendant's motion to suppress statements.21 The court of
appeals found that an interrogation had in fact taken place22 and that sup-
pression was called for under Miranda v. Arizona.2 3 The trial court's denial
of the suppression motion, however, was viewed as harmless error 2 4 because
the defendant could have been convicted of gun charges25 in the absence of
defendant's statements on the basis of the arresting officer's testimony. 26
At the time of defendant's initial confrontation with the police in the stair-
well of a building, the arresting officer saw a gun on the floor where the
defendant had been crouching.27 Prior to the arrest and Miranda warnings,
but after the defendant was ordered at gunpoint out of the stairwell, the
officer asked defendant to explain why he carried a gun.28 The defendant
replied that he carried the gun for his own protection.29 The court of ap-
peals found that the circumstances of this confrontation indicated that the
defendant was in custody30 and that the officer's question was an
17. Id. The breathalyzer test indicated a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .27% in defend-
ant Schram. Id. Per se intoxication occurs at .10% BAC. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b)(1)
(Supp. 1985).
18. 485 A.2d at 624 & n.l.
19. 477 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1984).
20. Id. at 724.
21. Id. at 721.
22. Id. at 724.
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. 477 A.2d at 721, 724.
25. Carrying a pistol without a license, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3204 (1981); possession of
an unregistered firearm, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2311 (198 1); and unlawful possession of ammu-
nition, D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2361 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
26. 477 A.2d at 724.
27. Id. at 722.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 722-23. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, indicates that defendant is in custody when
deprived of freedom in any significant way.
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interrogation.31
In Rogers v. United States,32 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
found no violation of a defendant's asserted right to be silent where the de-
fendant initiated the conversation with police officers while in custody. 3 In
Rogers, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder while armed, 4
among lesser offenses. On appeal, the defendant argued that denial of his
motion at trial to suppress statements made to police officers while in cus-
tody was a violation of his fifth amendment rights under Miranda.5 Shortly
after his arrest, the defendant was advised of his rights and he invoked his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel.36 The defendant, however,
then stated spontaneously, "I had to sacrifice him,"37 referring to the person
he had killed. Following up on this statement, the police asked questions
and were able to gain additional information from defendant enabling them
to recover the body of the victim.
38
The court of appeals found that the defendant had shown a willingness to
discuss the investigation and had initiated the conversation with the police.3 9
The court also found that the defendant had made a knowing waiver of his
asserted right to have an attorney present during interrogation. 40 The court
stated that even though defendant exhibited bizarre rhyming patterns of
speech, he was responsive to police questions when not rhyming.4 Further-
more, the defendant had been in custody just a short time, and the police
treatment of defendant showed no efforts to trick or to coerce him.42 The
court held that these facts supported the conclusion that the defendant made
31. 477 A.2d at 723-24. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Innis indi-
cates that interrogation occurs when the police officer acts in such a way that the officer should
know is "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
But see Owens v. United States, 340 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1975) (no interrogation occurred where
police officer asked subject "what he was doing on the roof"). Id. at 822, 824.
32. 483 A.2d 277 (D.C. 1984).
33. Id. at 285.
34. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2403, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
35. Rogers, 483 A.2d at 279.
36. Id. at 281.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 281-82.
39. Id. at 285. Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), the accused can
waive his right to have an attorney present during questioning, even after he has invoked that
right, by the accused's initiating conversation with the police.
40. 483 A.2d at 285. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 (1983), states that the
accused makes a knowing waiver of his right to silence and of his right to have an attorney
present where the totality of the circumstances shows that defendant understood his rights and
that the police engaged in no impropriety.
41. 483 A.2d at 285.
42. Id.
[Vol. 34:12931296
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a knowing waiver of his Miranda rights.43
II. TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Voir Dire
In Young v. United States," a three-judge panel of the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals held that exclusion of the defendant from the bench
voir dire of prospective jurors did not require reversal of defendant's subse-
quent conviction.45 In Young," the defendant was accused of unlawful en-
try and attempted second degree burglary.47 Before jury selection began for
the trial on this charge, the trial judge refused defendant's request to partici-
pate in the voir dire of veniremen at the bench.4" Two prospective jurors
who were questioned at the bench without defendant being present eventu-
ally became sworn jurors. 49 The defendant was convicted of unlawful entry
and he appealed.5° The defendant claimed that the trial judge erred, under
Robinson v. United States,51 in excluding him from the bench voir dire.52
In an opinion by Judge Yeagley, the unanimous panel reiterated the
Robinson holding that review of cases involving exclusion of defendants
from the bench during voir dire would take place on an ad hoc basis and
would not call for per se reversal.53 Examining the record in Young,54 the
panel concluded that because appellant neither proved nor claimed preju-
dice, and because the entire bench voir dire totaled just twelve pages of tran-
script, appellant's presence at the bench during voir dire of two jurors would
not have changed the outcome of the case.55 The court noted in contrast
that the bench voir dire in Robinson involved twenty-six jurors and forty
pages of transcript.56
In Boone v. United States,57 the full District of Columbia Court of Appeals
43. Id.
44. 478 A.2d 287 (D.C. 1984).
45. Id. at 290-91.
46. Id. at 288.
47. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3102, 22-103, 22-1801 (1981).
48. 478 A.2d at 288.
49. Id. at 290.
50. Id. at 287.
51. 448 A.2d 853 (D.C. 1982), reh'g en banc denied by equally divided court, 456 A.2d 848
(D.C. 1983) (per curiam).
52. 478 A.2d at 290.
53. Id. (citing Robinson v. United States, 448 A.2d 853, 856 (D.C. 1982), reh'g en banc
denied by an equally divided court, 456 A.2d 848 (D.C. 1983) (per curiam)).
54. 478 A.2d at 290.
55. Id. at 291.
56. Id.
57. 483 A.2d 1135 (D.C. 1984).
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handled another appeal under Robinson, and held six to three that failure to
permit defendant to be present at bench voir dire was reversible error.58 In
Boone, 9 the defendant was charged with assault with intent to kill while
armed,6' malicious disfigurement,6 ' and possession of a prohibited
weapon.62 His request to be present at the bench voir dire of prospective
jurors was denied by the trial judge.63 After his conviction he appealed,
claiming the trial judge erred in refusing his request to be present at the
bench voir dire."
Relying in part on the Robinson holding, the majority opinion in Boone
stated that such an exclusion severely limited defendant's ability to exercise
peremptory challenges to prospective jurors and, thus, constituted reversible
error.65 It noted that twenty-three prospective jurors were questioned at the
bench, filling thirty pages of transcript,66 much closer to the facts in the
Robinson case than those in Young. 67 The majority opinion noted that an ad
hoc review of such exclusion cases would continue, 68 although dicta con-
cerning alternatives to face-to-face confrontation between defendants and
prospective jurors seem to suggest a mandatory defendant presence in some
form at the bench during voir dire.69
Part II of a concurring opinion written by Judge Belson, and joined in
part by five judges of the nine-member court,70 stated forcefully that a de-
fendant has a fundamental constitutional right to be present during voir dire
at the bench to protect his ability to exercise challenges for cause to prospec-
tive jurors. 71 The concurring opinion also makes clear that a proposed
amendment to Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a), which
would allow judges to require defendant to remain seated at counsel table
during voir dire held at the bench, "violates the Constitution., 72 In Part I of
his concurrence, Judge Belson, not joined by any other judge, was careful to
58. Id. at 1143.
59. Id. at 1136.
60. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-501, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
61. Id. §§ 22-506, 22-3202.
62. Id. § 22-3214 (1981).
63. 483 A.2d at 1136-37.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1140.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
68. 483 A.2d at 1141 & n.73.
69. Id. at 1144.
70. The five judges joined in part II of the concurrence, dealing with challenges for cause,
but did not join in part I, concerning peremptory challenges. Id. at 1142-44.
71. Id. at 1144 (Belson, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 1143 (Belson, J., concurring).
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point out that no constitutional right attaches to the exercise of peremptory
challenges.7 3 An additional concurring opinion, authored by Judge Ferren,
and joined in by four others, including the author of the majority opinion,
stated that because the same proceeding involves challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges, "a defendant's right to be present at voir dire for
either purpose necessarily embraces the right to be present for the other."74
Given this concurrence, and the fact that a majority of the court joined
Judge Belson's concurrence, the court may have suggested that a fundamen-
tal constitutional right exists to be present at the bench for either peremp-
tory challenges or challenges for cause.
Three dissenting judges in Boone stated that the matter of defendant's
presence at bench voir dire lay within the discretion of the trial court.75 The
court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's refusal to allow defend-
ant to be present at the bench and endorsed the trial judge's balancing of
factors for and against the defendant's presence.76 The trial judge weighed
the benefit that the defendant might gain, for the purpose of exercising chal-
lenges, by hearing veniremen first-hand, against the prejudice the veniremen
might experience by discussing intimate details face-to-face with the ac-
cused.77 The dissenting judges went on to endorse the former local prac-
tice.7" In this method of voir dire, the defendant remains at the counsel
table and is not present at the bench.79 The defense counsel then conveys
the substance of the bench voir dire to defendant.8 ° Through the use of this
method, the dissent hoped that the defendant could effectively exercise his
challenges while avoiding embarrassment to the veniremen.81
B. Double Jeopardy
In Parker v. United States, 2 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause barred the defend-
ant's convictions for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle 3 and for grand
larceny 4 because both crimes arose from the same acts.8 5 On defendant's
73. Id. at 1142 (Belson, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1142 (Ferren, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1145 (quoting United States v. Bryant, 471 F.2d 1040, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 112 (1973)).
76. 483 A.2d at 1145.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1149.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 476 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1984).
83. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2204 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
84. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2201 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
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appeal on other grounds, the government raised the double jeopardy issue.8 6
The government claimed that the charges grew out of two distinct events,
the actual taking of the car and then its unauthorized use, separated by three
days. 7 The convictions for the two offenses, the government argued, were
therefore not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. 8
The court of appeals rejected this view,89 holding that the issue had been
settled by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Ohio.' In Brown, a
defendant was convicted of auto theft and joyriding.91 On appeal, the
Supreme Court rejected the government's claim that the nine-day period be-
tween the acts of defendant that gave rise to convictions for both offenses
avoided the double jeopardy prohibition.92 The court of appeals in Parker
adopted the Supreme Court's statement in Brown that the double jeopardy
clause cannot be avoided "by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime
into a series of temporal or spatial units."93 The two convictions in Parker
thus fell within the Supreme Court's holding in Brown.94 The court of ap-
peals vacated the unauthorized use conviction because it violated the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution.9" The conviction subjected defendant to
multiple punishment for the same offense because the degree of proof re-
quired for a conviction for unauthorized use was no more than that required
for grand larceny. 96
This result in Parker also follows from the court of appeals' earlier ruling
in Arnold v. United States.97 The Arnold court, also relying on Brown, va-
cated a conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle obtained with a
conviction for grand larceny of the same vehicle. 9 The court vacated the
unauthorized use conviction because it required no further proof than that
necessary to establish the grand larceny conviction.99
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Routh v. United States,"'°
85. 476 A.2d at 176.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
91. Id. at 162.
92. Id. at 169.
93. 476 A.2d at 176 (citing Brown, 432 U.S. at 169).
94. 476 A.2d at 176.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 176-77.
97. 467 A.2d 136 (D.C. 1983).
98. Id. at 139.
99. Id.
100. 483 A.2d 638 (D.C. 1984).
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held that the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause prohibited retrial of
defendant where the trial court granted the prosecutor's motion for a mis-
trial because the prosecution had failed to show the "manifest necessity" to
sustain such a motion. 101 In Routh,"0 2 the defendant was charged with as-
sault with intent to kill,'0 3 carrying a pistol without a license"° and destruc-
tion of property.105 The eyewitness to the shooting was also the victim of
the alleged attack.'0 6 The prosecution wanted a crime scene technician to
corroborate testimony of the eyewitness and to authenticate photographs
taken at the scene.' 07 This technician became unavailable due to illness after
the jury had been impaneled.'0 8 The prosecution then made a motion for
mistrial due to the unavailability of the ill technician.'" The trial court
granted the motion over defendant's objection. 0 Defendant then moved to
dismiss the indictment."' The trial judge denied the motion and defendant
appealed. 112
On defendant's appeal, the court of appeals found" 3 that the trial judge's
decision to grant the prosecution's motion for a mistrial did not meet the
strict standard of review for such actions stated by the Supreme Court in
Arizona v. Washington. "' According to the Routh court, when a trial judge
decides to grant a mistrial based on the unavailability of "critical prosecu-
tion evidence," Arizona requires that he must base that decision on a finding
that the evidence is essential to the case and the resulting mistrial is of "man-
ifest necessity."''" 5 The court of appeals held in Routh that the prosecution
failed to show that the crime scene technician was essential." 6 The trial
judge's decision to grant the mistrial without such a showing, the court held,
lacked sound discretion because no manifest necessity existed.' In his dis-
sent, Judge Pair saw no abuse of discretion and maintained that the mistrial
101. Id. at 639, 645.
102. Id. at 640.
103. D.C. CODE ANN. 22-501, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
104. Id. § 22-3204 (1981).
105. Id. § 22-403 (1981).
106. 483 A.2d at 640.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 641.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 645.
114. 434 U.S. 497, 508 (1978). See Coleman v. United States, 449 A.2d 327, 329 (D.C.
1982) (dismissal is required where mistrial unnecessarily declared).
115. 483 A.3d at 642 (quoting Arizona, 434 U.S. at 508).
116. Id. at 645.
117. Id.
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was necessary because the unavailable witness was needed to accurately re-
construct the crime scene." 8 Nor did Judge Pair see any indication that the
prosecution sought the mistrial in order to obtain another opportunity to
convict defendant." 9
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In Hawthorne v. United States, 2 ' the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals reversed the felony murder 121 convictions of two codefendants and re-
manded for a new trial after finding that the defendants were substantially
prejudiced by the prosecutor's misconduct in his closing arguments.' 22 At
the close of evidence, the prosecutor delivered his closing argument by tak-
ing on the character of the victim of the murder and by making much of this
argument in the first person.' 23 The defense moved for a mistrial immedi-
ately after the conclusion of this closing argument, and on appeal, defend-
ants renewed their claim of substantial prejudice. 124 The court of appeals
found that the prosecutor's performance in his closing argument expressed
his personal opinion about the victim's thoughts. 125 The court also found
that the prosecutor employed facts not in evidence, and that these facts only
served to inflame the jury. 26 These actions by the prosecutor amounted to
prosecutorial excess that resulted in substantial prejudice to defendants re-
quiring reversal, according to the court. 21
In Sherrod v. United States,121 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's claim of plain error 29 in the prosecutor's miscon-
duct during closing argument.' 30 In Sherrod, '3' the defendant was accused
118. Id. at 647 (Pair, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 648 (Pair, J., dissenting).
120. 476 A.2d 164 (D.C. 1984).
121. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1981).
122. 476 A.2d at 173.
123. Id. at 170.
124. Defense counsel made the tactical decision to refrain from objecting during the prose-
cutor's closing argument. On appeal, the government claimed that this was a waiver of objec-
tion and that the "plain error" standard therefore governed. The court of appeals disagreed
and held that the defense preserved the issue for review by objecting at the end of the prosecu-
tor's closing argument. Id. at 169-70.
125. Id. at 171-72.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 172-73.
128. 478 A.2d 644 (D.C. 1984).
129. The court in Sherrod applied the plain error standard to the review of the prosecutor's
conduct because the defense did not object to the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments.
Id. at 655.
130. Id. at 658.
131. Id. at 649.
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of first degree murder while armed' 32 and assault with intent to kill. 33
In his closing argument, the prosecutor expressed his personal belief that,
at the scene of the crime, defendant thought he had killed an individual who
later appeared to testify at trial.134 The prosecutor also commented that the
defendant was therefore surprised by the witness' appearance at trial. 3 The
court found these comments improper and contrary to the rule that counsel
must avoid expressing personal opinions so that the jury can focus on the
evidence.' 36 The prosecutor during closing also expressed his opinion as to
the demeanor of two witnesses by stating that the jury saw fear in the faces
of two witnesses who testified against defendant.' 37 The court found this
comment improper because it is for the jury to evaluate subjective demeanor
evidence. 138 Furthermore, the court found the prosecutor's comment on the
defendant's decision to testify last to be improper because it was an attempt
to draw adverse inferences on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional
right. 139
The prosecutor's closing comment on the credibility of defense witnesses,
however, was not seen as improper. "4 The testimony of these witnesses con-
tained inconsistencies and the prosecutor was, therefore, free to comment on
them. 4 ' The court thus found no impropriety in the comment on the verac-
ity of witnesses.' 42 Similarly, there was no impropriety in the prosecutor's
comment on defendant's way of life and activities related to heroin use.' 43
The court found this to be a reasonable inference from the evidence and an
effective rebuttal to the defense counsel's closing statement comparing de-
fendant, who had no prior criminal record, with the government witnesses
who were heroin users."' In its summation, the court held that neither
alone nor in combination did the instances of prosecutorial misconduct con-
stitute plain error.'4
In Bowler v. United States,'46 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
132. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2401, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
133. Id. § 22-501 (1981).
134. 478 A.2d at 655-66.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 656.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 656-57.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 657.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 657-58.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 658.
146. 480 A.2d 687 (D.C. 1984).
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reversed a second degree murder1 47 conviction based on plain error in the
prosecutor's conduct. 148 Much of the prosecutorial misconduct was viewed
by the court as having contaminated the jury's deliberation on the issue of
malice necessary for a verdict of second degree murder.1 49 On remand, the
government was given the option of retrying defendant on the second degree
murder charge or of accepting entry of a judgment of manslaughter, which
does not require a showing of malice."'
The court of appeals in Bowler also found prosecutorial misconduct in
statements made during opening, closing, and rebuttal arguments that high-
lighted the fact that the defendant elected not to testify.1"' Defendant was
the sole eyewitness to the murder committed by him, and the prosecutor
commented repeatedly on the lack of any eyewitness testimony during the
case.1 - 2 Judge Mack and Chief Judge Newman of the three-judge panel
found these comments to be "tantamount to comment on [defendant's]...
failure to testify." ' 3 In his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, Judge Gallagher disagreed with this conclusion, and stated that the
prosecutor's comments were "within the bounds of reasonable advocacy." 5 4
D. Bad Acts and Other Crimes Evidence
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Jones v. United States,'
rejected the defendant's claim of abuse of discretion in the lower court's ad-
mission at trial of evidence of defendant's prior bad acts. 5 6 In Jones, the
defendant was convicted of first degree murder5 7 and lesser offenses.'5
These charges grew out of an argument and shooting at which defendant's
girlfriend was killed. 59 The defendant and his girlfriend had carried on a
tumultuous relationship for many years.'6 ° The government intended to
produce at trial witnesses who heard defendant threaten to shoot his girl-
friend on numerous occasions and who also had seen the defendant carrying
147. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22.2403 (1981).
148. 480 A.2d at 680.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 682-83.
152. Id.
153. 480 A.2d at 684.
154. Id. at 688 (Gallagher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. 477 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1984).
156. Id. at 234.
157. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1981).
158. 477 A.2d at 233.
159. Id. at 234.
160. Id.
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a gun prior to the killing.16' Over defense objection, the trial judge allowed
the prosecutor to introduce the evidence of the threats and of the gun posses-
sion as relevant to defendant's motive and intent. 1 62 An effort was made by
the trial judge to limit the remoteness of this evidence by only allowing evi-
dence of the gun possession that occurred in the late spring and summer of
1980, the period immediately prior to the murder in August 1980.163 The
trial judge failed to give a cautionary instruction sua sponte, and the defense
did not request the instruction. 64
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial judge erred in admitting
the evidence of the gun possession.' 65 The court of appeals stated that this
type of evidence was not in and of itself wrongful conduct. 166 The court was
able to draw this conclusion by distinguishing these facts from those which
would require the application of the principles enunciated in Drew v. United
States.'67 The court found, however, that where evidence of gun possession
was presented in connection with defendant's prior threats, the gun evidence
constituted prior bad acts evidence.' 68 By this interpretation, the gun evi-
dence could then be admitted to show intent and malice. ' 69 The court then
went on to conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ad-
mitting the gun evidence. 7° This holding was based on the court's accept-
ance of the trial judge's examination of the probative value of the evidence as
well as on the court's acceptance of the trial judge's limitation of the gun
possession evidence to that period immediately prior to the killing.'
As for the failure of the trial judge to give sua sponte a cautionary instruc-
tion to the jury on the limited use of this evidence, the court found no plain
error.'72 The court repeated its refusal to set a per se rule requiring reversal
161. Id.
162. Id. at 234 & n.3.
163. Id. at 239.
164. Id. at 241.
165. Id. at 237.
166. Id. at 237-38 (citing Fornah v. United States, 460 A.2d 556, 562 (D.C. 1983)).
167. 477 A.2d at 237-38. Drew states the rule that evidence of other crimes is admissible to
show intent, motive, absence of mistake or accident, common scheme or plan, or identity. 331
F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964). There must be a "concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts
relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed" in order for the other crimes
evidence to be admissible to show one or more of these elements. If the similarity test is met,
any prejudicial effect in the jury's use of the evidence to infer defendant's disposition to commit
the crime charged is held to be outweighed by the probative value of the evidence. Id. See
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
168. 477 A.2d at 238.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 240-41.
171. Id. at 239-40.
172. Id. at 242.
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where the trial judge fails to give the cautionary instruction when bad acts
evidence is admitted. 7 3 Examining the facts of the case, the court of appeals
saw little risk that the jury misused the bad acts evidence when determining
defendant's intent.'74 This is because the prosecutor in his closing argument
did not contend that the gun evidence displayed a predisposition on the part
of defendant to commit the crime in question.' 75 Rather, defense counsel in
his closing argument maintained that the evidence was used only for the
showing of intent.176
In Gates v. United States,177 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of
other crimes. 1 78 Defendant in Gates was charged with rape while armed, 17 9
first degree murder while armed,'8 ' and lesser offenses.181 The government
intended to introduce evidence that the defendant had committed attempted
robbery a few weeks before the murder in question.' 82 The defendant's pre-
trial attempt to exclude this evidence failed and testimony regarding the de-
fendant's actions at the time of the attempted robbery was admitted at trial
over his objection.'8 3 This evidence revealed that the defendant was armed
and pushed himself on top of the victim on the ground.' 8 4 It was admitted
to show defendant's intent, plan, and identity.'8 5 Subsequently, the defend-
ant was convicted of rape, murder, and gun charges.'8 6 On appeal, he ar-
gued that this evidence did not show sufficient similarity with the crime
charged.' 87 The prejudicial effect thus outweighed the probative value, the
defendant argued.'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in a detailed examination of
the similarities between the evidence and the crime charged, concluded that
there was sufficient similarity for admission under the Drew common plan or
identity tests.'8 9 In this examination, the court found that the two attacks
173. Id.
174. Id. at 242-46.
175. Id. at 243.
176. Id.
177. 481 A.2d 120 (D.C. 1984).
178. Id. at 123.
179. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2801, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
180. Id. §§ 22-2401, 22-2302.
181. 481 A.2d at 121.
182. Id. at 122.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 121.
187. Id. at 123.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Drew, 331 F.2d at 89-90).
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were within a few hundred yards of each other and within nineteen days of
each other; that both victims were of the same race and approximate age;
and that both attacks began as robberies but became assaults.' 90
The court of appeals also held in Gates that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding other crimes evidence offered by the accused.' 91
Defendant hoped to employ other crimes evidence to show that he had been
misidentified in a previous rape case.' 92 This evidence would have shown
that a rape had occurred in the same park as the rape in question.' 93 It
would also have shown that the defendant was identified as the rapist, but
that it was impossible for him to have been the rapist because he was incar-
cerated at the time the rape occurred.' 94 By use of this evidence, defendant
hoped to offset the prejudicial effect of the government's other crimes evi-
dence and to argue that a look-alike rapist had committed the offense in
question.' 95 The trial court ruled this evidence inadmissible because the
Drew similarities test was not satisfied.' 96 On appeal, the court of appeals
agreed and pointed out that the defendant's other crimes evidence lacked the
detailed similarity that the government's other crimes evidence possessed. "
In addition, part of defendant's proffer was inadmissible because it was based
on hearsay presented by a police officer that a rape victim had identified
defendant as the assailant. 9 ' This presentation, without the testimony of
the victim, also lacked the detailed similarity necessary for the Drew test. 99
Significantly, in holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding defendant's proffered other crimes evidence, the court of appeals
explicitly refused to decide whether defendant can offer evidence of other
crimes committed by someone other than defendant.2"
E. Closing Argument
In Sherrod v. United States,201 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's claim of error in the trial court's refusal to allow
defense counsel to read aloud from the trial transcript during closing argu-
190. Id. at 122.
191. Id. at 124.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 124-25.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 125.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 478 A.2d 644 (D.C. 1984).
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ment.20 2 In Sherrod ,203 the defendant was on trial for first degree murder
while armed2" and for assault with intent to kill.20 5 At closing argument,
the defense requested a reading from the transcript to show that the prosecu-
tor had distorted the evidence presented by two defense witnesses.2 '6 The
trial judge at first allowed the request but the prosecutor objected on the
grounds that the reading would highlight these portions of testimony.2"7
The prosecutor maintained that the jury should be guided by its memory of
the testimony unaffected by any emphasis that might result from a reading of
the testimony.2 °8 The trial judge allowed defense counsel to instead refer to
the transcript during delivery of his closing argument.' Counsel could
then make comments to the jury on the testimony without actually reading
it.210 Defendant appealed this ruling, seeking review of the trial judge's re-
fusal to allow counsel to read the transcript aloud during closing.21'
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court and held that al-
lowing counsel to read from the transcript during closing was within the
discretion of the trial judge.21 2 The court saw little risk of undue emphasis
of the portions that might be read aloud and rejected a per se rule prohibit-
ing the practice of reading from the transcript during closing argument.21 3
In addition, the court saw no flaw in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in
this case because defense counsel, after silently reading the transcript, did
make reference in his closing argument to portions of the witness' testi-
mony.2 4 Thus, the trial court's decision to bar reading aloud during closing
did not prejudice defendant.215
J. Bradley Ortins
202. Id at 664.
203. Id at 649.
204. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2401, 22-3202 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
205. Id. § 22-501 (1981).
206. 478 A.2d at 662.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id
211. Id.
212. Id at 664.
213. Id
214. Id
215. Id.
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